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DIVERSITY, COMPLIANCE, ETHICS & IN-HOUSE
COUNSEL
Steven A. Ramirez*
INTRODUCTION
J UDGE Stanley Sporkin once asked "[w]here ... were [all] the ...
attorneys" when considering the wrongdoing and ethically dubious
misconduct underlying the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. 1 Variations of
this question pop-up with each new financial fraud of any significant magnitude.
2
After the Enron series of financial frauds, around the turn of this century,
Congress acted aggressively to empower attorneys to blow the whistle on frauds
within publicly-traded firms. 3  Within the publicly-traded firm, policymakers
assume that serious wrongdoing cannot occur without at least arousing the
suspicions of some attorney that supposedly represents the corporation and is
duty bound to protect shareholders from the adverse consequences of wrongful
conduct, such as securities fraud.4 On the other hand, attorneys ultimately work
under the supervision of senior management of the firm, and this fact impedes the
ability of counsel for the firm to blow the whistle on any wrongdoing within the
firm or outside the firm, if senior management is involved or benefits in the
wrongdoing. 5 In-house counsel, in particular, may face termination for blowing
* Professor of Law and Director, Business Law Center, Loyola University Chicago. Marko
Stojkovic provided helpful research assistance for this essay. Sramir3@luc.edu.
1. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
2. Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 76 (1993) ("Where were the lawyers?
Perhaps rhetorical, even sarcastic, this question is being asked all too frequently after large
financial frauds.").
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012)).
4. Thomas Lee Hazen, Administrative Law Controls on Attorney Practice-A Look at the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Lawyer Conduct Rules, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 323, 339 (2003)
("The role lawyers play in facilitating securities fraud, albeit unwittingly in many cases, should not
be ignored. This has been a recent concern of the roles lawyers play as a result of failures such as
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco. However, this is not a new concern.").
5. See, e.g., Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-The-Ladder
Reporting by Insulating In-House Corporate Attorneys from Managerial Power, 39 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 861, 883 (2015) (proposing an independent committee of the board with responsibility for hiring
and firing the company's CLO and endowed with final approval over terminating the employment
any in-house attorneys that work directly for the firm).
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the whistle on wrongdoing. 6 This essay posits that cultural diversity can help in-
house counsel achieve superior ethical, compliance, and reputation risk
management outcomes for their firms, and therefore in-house counsel should
seek to maximize cultural diversity within the corps of corporate counsel
representing firms, and throughout the firm.7
The most recent financial frauds-those that almost destroyed modem
capitalism in 2008-2009-involved massive securities fraud, which could not
possibly have occurred without the participation or knowledge of some lawyer
that putatively represented the public firms at the center of that catastrophe.8 The
Great Financial Crisis of 2008-20099 ("Great Financial Crisis") illustrates the
difficulty of creating proper incentives for attorneys to blow the whistle on fraud
occurring within client firms, either to the regulatory authorities or to senior
management inside the firm.' Indeed, I wrote in 2010 on this very topic with a
view to suggesting significant adjustments to facilitate the legal compliance role
that attorneys should play to protect the shareholders of public firms. 1
Specifically, I proposed an independent legal compliance committee that could
receive anonymous reports from corporate counsel and others with evidence of
6. Jennifer Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for Attorney-
Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 491, 544-45 (2016)
(proposing expanded whistleblower protections for in-house counsel).
7. Orlando C. Richard et al., The Impact of Racial Diversity on Intermediate and Long-term
Performance: The Moderating Role of Environmental Context, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1213, 1229
(2007) ("Cultural diversity exists when people with distinct and different group affiliations of
cultural significance are found within larger group or organization."). This implies no compromise
in terms of financial performance. "The delightful discovery is that beyond moderate levels of
diversity we find a positive effect of racial diversity on both our short-term and long-term measures
of performance." Id. at 1229.
8. Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 700-08 (2014) (providing a detailed history
of the Enron Scandal and the run-up to the 2008 Financial Crisis). Even after the financial frauds
underlying the Great Financial Crisis occurred, new scandals involving the silence of in-house
counsel emerged. See Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1867, 1867-68 (2016) ("Though primary blame should perhaps rest with GM's engineers,
who apparently did not understand how their vehicles were built, GM's inside lawyers, who
handled engineering, safety, and products liability issues, must be faulted for having obscured the
deadly defect.").
9. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 707 n.251 (explaining that "the term 'Great Financial Crisis of
2008' [denotes] the massive global financial market disruption that commenced with the failure of
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and ending in the spring of 2009 when the U.S. stock
market hit a low of below 7000 in the Dow Jones Industrial Average" in accordance with the
recognition of two former Federal Reserve chiefs that this crisis inflicted "unprecedented
virulence" on the American financial system).
10. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
11. Steven A. Ramirez, Legal Risk Post-SOX and the Subprime Fiasco: Back to the Drawing
Board, in ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 351-67 (John Fraser & Betty J. Simkins eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board].
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wrongdoing.' 2  In the years since the crisis, no evidence of any attorney
whistleblower emerged, save one female lawyer.' 3 While Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, that Act did not materially change the duties of counsel
representing firms, even financial firms.' 4 Thus, no significant change regarding
the duties of counsel occurred after the Great Financial Crisis, or since the
subprime debacle.' 
5
This essay suggests that in-house counsel interested in protecting
shareholders from the costs of misconduct within their firms, however, can take
proactive steps to protect shareholders from the kind of skullduggery that drove
all aspects of the subprime crisis, as well as the Enron series of frauds.' 6 Along
the way, in-house counsel may help avert future macroeconomic crises like the
one that followed in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis. 17 Part I shows
that because of fundamental differences in acculturation experiences, diverse
groups hold different perspectives on ethics, compliance and risk. Part II
explains the recent legal and regulatory evolution of corporate counsel's
gatekeeper role in assuring that the corporation complies with law and adheres to
ethical norms, and it explores why that evolution has not stopped corporate
counsel from remaining silent in the face of manifest misconduct. Part III
focuses on how general counsel and attorneys working in-house at public firms
can overcome the well-known barriers counsel faces in achieving a superior
outcome in risk management related to ethics and compliance using enhanced
12. I proposed an independent committee of the board composed entirely of lawyers that
would function to receive reports of wrongdoing within the firm (including anonymous reports) and
to conduct an annual legal compliance audit. Id. at 362-63.
13. See MARY K. RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH:
RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET 99, 207 (2017) (reviewing all whistleblowers
emerging in the run up to the financial crisis and only identifying one lawyer, Alayne Fleischmann,
who blew the whistle long after the crisis). See also Lucy Burton, What J.P. Morgan's 'Worst
Nightmare' Thinks About Whistleblowing, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015, 9:48 AM ET),
http://on.wsj.com/l EY9FgC ("A Canadian who worked as a securities lawyer at the bank between
2006 and 2008, Ms. Fleischmann turned over information on the bank's dealings in sourced
mortgage-backed bonds before the financial crisis.").
14. The Democrats on the House Committee on Financial Services published a summary of the
Dodd-Frank Act that demonstrates the lack of any new regulation of duties owed by attorneys.
DEMOCRATS OF THE U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, http://democrats.financialservices.
house.gov/uploadedfiles/41 73briefsummaryofd-f.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
15. Congress did act to enhance cultural diversity in the financial sector. See Kristin Johnson
et al., Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd-Frank Section 342 Help Stabilize the Financial
Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 1867-68 (2016) (concluding that Congress acted
appropriately in seeking to diversify the financial sector).
16. See RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, supra note 13, at 1-27, 31-40 (providing an overview of the
wrongdoing underlying the Great Financial Crisis and the Enron era criminal frauds).
17. By any reckoning, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 was a multi-trillion-dollar
catastrophe. See Tyler Atkinson et al., How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007-
09 Financial Crisis, 20 FED. RES. BANK OF DALL.: STAFF PAPERS 1-2, 19 (2013),
https://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1 301 .pdf (estimating total cost of crisis in
United States alone at up to fourteen trillion dollars and suggesting that the trajectory of potential
GDP may be permanently lower).
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cultural diversity. The essay concludes that cultural diversity gives in-house
counsel a key tool for guiding the corporation to superior shareholder value and
sustainable financial performance.
I. THE DIVERSITY DIFFERENCE IN COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS
In the legal academy, much debate has surrounded the efficacy of cultural
diversity along a number of important metrics. 8 Nevertheless, skeptics of the
value of cultural diversity only rarely focus on the best practices for empowering
diverse voices that are necessary for unleashing the power of cultural diversity.
In studies focusing on the best managers of diversity, including the notion that
diversity management requires empowering diverse voices and achieving a
critical mass of diversity, the benefits become manifest relative to studies that
include those pursuing mere tokenism.2 0 This essay builds on the premise that
management of cultural diversity is critical to unleashing its benefits.2' Legal
18. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85
(2000) (collecting sources regarding the advantages of a diverse workforce). More recently,
scholars recognize that while well-managed diversity may lead to superior board performance, the
empirical data on the mere presence of diverse board members is mixed. See Deborah L. Rhode &
Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?,
39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 393 (2014) ("Although empirical research has drawn much-needed
attention to the underrepresentation of women and minorities on corporate boards, it has not
convincingly established that board diversity leads to improved financial performance."); Lissa
Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone
Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432-33 (2008) ("Recent quantitative studies primarily test for a
relationship between board diversity and various measures of corporate performance ... studies find
evidence that ... board diversity positively affects firm performance. Other studies, however, find
no support for this theory."); Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women
Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 Mo. L. REV. 579, 593 (2006)
(summarizing the empirical data addressing the impact of diversity contingent upon the number of
women in the boardroom). Rhode and Packel acknowledge that well-managed diversity and
diversity arising from a critical mass of voices may support different conclusions than that reached
in their review in 2014. Rhode & Packel, supra, at 377, 408-11. See also Kristin N. Johnson,
Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial Firms' Risk Oversight, 70 SMU
L. REV. 153, 202 (2017) (surveying empirical evidence on gender diversity and finding that gender
diversity improves risk management outcomes).
19. Recently, several financial regulators released proposed guidelines for the pursuit of
diversity in the financial sector that serves as one recent source on the best practices needed to
unleash the benefits of diversity. See Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint
Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the Agencies,
80 Fed. Reg. 33,016 (June 10, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-06-10/pdf/2015-
14126.pdf [hereinafter "Joint Guidelines"] (discussing the contentious public commentary over the
standards promulgated by the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion).
20. Ramirez, supra note 18, at 109-10 ("[Businesses] need ... policies that assure that business
organizations truly embrace diversity rather than pursue policies of tokenism or tacit exclusion. The
point is that diversity must be properly managed."). See also Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and
Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education Symposium: Meeting the
Challenge of Grutter: Affirmative Action in Twenty-Five Years, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 208 (2006)
("Tokenism is the enemy of diversity.").
21. See, e.g., Yves R.F. Guillaume et al., Harnessing Demographic Differences in
Organizations: What Moderates the Effects of Workplace Diversity?, 38 J. ORGAN. BEHAVIOR 276,
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scholars questioning the value of diversity frequently do not note the difference
between well-managed diversity and tokenism.2
Thus, for example, those firms that achieve "Diversity Elite" status from
Fortune magazine's assessment of those with the best diversity practices
outperform firms not in the Diversity Elite, according to a study published in
232015. Prior research found that "firms recognized by Fortune magazine for
highly effective diversity management practices experience initial shareholder
gains thereby suggesting competitive advantages consistent with the resource-
based view of the firm."'24 The 2015 study expanded upon this prior finding by
expanding its assessment to all levels of firm diversity and investigating the
channels by which firm value is enhanced. The study concluded:
Having a diverse group of employees from different ethnic groups is likely to
enhance the firm's ability to identify unmet customer needs, develop more creative
products or services, uncover new distribution strategies, build stronger
relationships with key stakeholders, and make better firm level decisions among a
host of other factors that drive firm performance. For those firms already engaging
in actions that foster diversity, our findings shed some light on how ethnic diversity
at different levels of the organization is more important within certain contexts as it
may allow a firm to tap into varying sources of value creation stemming from
innovation.
25
This essay, therefore, proceeds upon the basis that unlocking the benefits of
diversity requires attention to the best diversity practices for managing cultural
diversity in a specific context-the provision of legal services to the publicly
traded firm and the management of ethics and compliance risk implicit in that
context.
Scholars long ago recognized that cultural diversity operates to positively
influence compliance and ethics.26 These long-standing empirical findings also
295 (2017) ("Our findings ... imply that well-designed teams and organizations are important to
manage diversity effectively."); Adam D. Galinsky et al., Maximizing the Gains and Minimizing
the Pains of Diversity, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. Scl. 742, 745 (2015) ("The practices of
inclusive multiculturalism and perspective taking also help catalyze the innovation and decision-
making benefits of diversity. For example, organizational climates that value diversity increase
information processing and exchange and thus produce better decisions. Similarly, when team
members consider one another's perspectives, diverse teams are more creative.").
22. Rhode and Packel do recognize the distinction. Rhode & Packel, supra note 18, at 377
(questioning empirical evidence regarding enhanced financial performance associated with diverse
boards but recognizing that well-managed diversity may nevertheless prove beneficial).
23. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Ellis & Phyllis Y. Keys, Workforce Diversity and Shareholder
Value: A Multi-Level Perspective, 44 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. ACCT. 191, 209-10 (2015) (finding
enhanced firm value for diverse workforces in firms that gamer Fortune "Diversity Elite"
recognition).
24. Id. at 193 (citing V.K. Pandey et al., The Relationship between Shareholder Wealth Effects,
Diversity, and Publicity as a Marketing Strategy, 33 J. ACAD. MARKETING Sci. 423 (2005)).
25. Id. at210.
26. See, e.g., William A. Weeks et al., The Effects of Gender and Career Stage on Ethical
Judgment, 20 J. Bus. ETHICS 301, 310-11 (1999) ("[I]t appears that an influx of more females into
the work force might improve the ethical environment based on how ethical problems are perceived
Spring 2017] 469
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enjoy support from a corollary finding: women 8 and ethnic minorities 29 approachrisk differently. 30 As the authors of one study stated:
[O]ur survey revealed that men rate a wide range of hazards as lower in risk than do
women. This result is consistent with gender differences found previously in many
studies. Our survey also revealed that whites rate risks lower than do nonwhites.
Nonwhite females often gave the highest risk ratings. The group with the
consistently lowest risk perceptions across a range of hazards was white males .... 31
Business management scholars identify numerous potential benefits arising from
a diverse workforce, many of which logically support more effective legal
representation for firms. 32 This essay focuses exclusively upon benefits in terms
of legal compliance and reputational risk.
Most recently, a series of studies demonstrated the benefits of senior
management diversity in terms of the Great Financial Crisis. 33 Superior risk
management paid off during the financial crisis.34  Essentially, senior
and resolved."). More recently, scholars found that firms with female directors suffered fewer
allegations of fraud. See generally Mary Jane Lenard et al., Female Business Leaders and the
Incidence of Fraud Litigation, 43 MANAGERIAL FIN. 59 (2017).
27. See Irwin P. Levin et al., The Interaction of Experiential and Situational Factors and
Gender in a Simulated Risky Decision-Making Task, 122 J. PSYCHOL. 173, 180 (1988) (finding that
women students were more risk averse than male students in an experimental setting).
28. See Thorsten Beck et al., Gender and Banking: Are Women Better Loan Officers?, 17 REV.
FIN. 1279, 1317 (2013) (finding female loan officers have fewer problematic loans).
29. See James Farrell, Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors of Investors, in INVESTOR
BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCIAL PLANNING AND INVESTING 117 (H. Kent Baker &
Victor Ricciardi eds., 2014) (compiling and reviewing empirical studies focusing on the differences
in investment behavior across race and gender groups).
30. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 465-66 (2007) ("Numerous
studies show that risk perceptions are skewed across gender and race: women worry more than
men, and minorities more than whites, about myriad dangers-from environmental pollution to
hand guns, from blood transfusions to red meat.").
31. Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The "White Male " Effect, 2
HEALTH, RISK & SOC'Y 159, 169 (2000) (internal citations omitted). The authors found that their
survey data did not support any biological explanation for diverse risk perceptions because
differences between men and women in risk perception differed across races; instead the authors
concluded that the differences were likely driven by socialization effects. Id. at 170.
32. See, e.g., Ellis & Keys, supra note 23, at 191 (finding that racial diversity at multiple work-
force levels enhanced firm value, particularly for firms with a need to communicate with end-user
customers and a need to innovate).
33. See, e.g., Ajay Palvia et al., Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More Conservative and
Risk Averse? Evidence from the Banking Industry During the Financial Crisis, 131 J. Bus. ETHICS
577, 592 (2015) (finding that banks with female CEOs posed lower risk of bank failure); Maureen
I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case of U.S.
Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 405 (2011) (finding that firms with
diverse leadership did not engage in as much subprime lending as firms with homogenous
leadership).
34. See generally Vincent Aebi et al., Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank
Performance in the Financial Crisis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 3213 (2012) (finding that banks with a
more independent risk management function outperformed other banks during the financial crisis).
470 [Vol. 48
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management teams with greater cultural diversity succumbed to the risks posed
during that crisis to a lesser extent than non-diverse senior management teams.35
Risk mismanagement played a central role in the Great Financial Crisis.36 The
powerful lesson from the world of financial and managerial scholarship for
corporate America in general is this: well-managed cultural diversity pays (in
terms of shareholder wealth maximization) through superior management of
compliance, ethics and other risks.
The different approach women and minorities take to issues relating to risk
also leads to more ethical behavior and legal compliance.37 Thus, gender and
ethnic diversity in the boardroom leads to higher levels of corporate
transparency. 38  According to one recent study, female CEOs exercise moreconservativism with respect to accounting issues.3 9 Another study found that
35. Laura St. Claire et al., Braving the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of
Female Board Directors on Bank Holding Company Performance 1 (Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Economics Working Paper No. 2016-1, 2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications/
publications-by-type/occ-working-papers/2016-2013/wp2O16-1.pdf ("We conclude that during the
financial crisis, controlling for financial and board governance characteristics, BHCs with at least
three female directors braved the crisis better, significantly outperforming BHCs with fewer female
directors, as measured by Tobin's Q.").
Our research contributes to the discussion of optimal board governance by exploring the
relationship between a critical mass of women on BHC boards of directors and performance.
During the financial crisis, controlling for financial and board governance characteristics,
BHCs with at least three women on their boards braved the crisis better, significantly
outperforming BHCs with fewer female directors. This conclusion contrasts with the results
over the 21-year span. Over this longer period, the performance of BHCs with at least three
female directors was not statistically different than that of BHCs with fewer female directors,
and BHCs with at least two female directors on average showed significantly lower
performance.
Id. at 24. See also Hisham Farag & Chris Mallin, Board Diversity and Financial Fragility:
Evidence from European Banks, 49 INT'L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 98 (2017) (finding that European
banks with a critical mass of female directors sported less financial vulnerability during the
financial crisis).
36. See Kristin N. Johnson & Steven A. Ramirez, New Guiding Principles: Macroprudential
Solutions to Risk Management Oversight and Systemic Risk Concerns, 11 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L.J.
386, 426 (2014) ("Recent proposals for large financial firms from the Fed and the OCC herald a
potential revolution in corporate governance ... [but] these corporate governance-oriented reforms
are too weak to stem the tidal wave of enterprise risk and systemic risk that risk management
failures at [public] firms create.").
37. Social scientists theorize that women approach ethics differently based upon gender
socialization. See Leslie Dawson, Ethical Differences Between Men and Women in the Sales
Profession, 16 J. Bus. ETHICS 1143, 1143-44 (1997) ("This theory holds that general and nearly
universal differences that characterize masculine and feminine personalities are formed in
childhood and are incontrovertible; these in turn differentially shape the work-related interests,
concerns, and values of the sexes.").
38. See, e.g., Arun Upadhyay & Hongchao Zeng, Gender and Ethnic Diversity on Boards and
Corporate Information Environment, 67 J. BUS. RES. 2456 (2014).
39. See Simon S.M. Ho et al., CEO Gender, Ethical Leadership, and Accounting
Conservatism, 127 J. Bus. ETHICS 351, 366 (2015) ("[R]egardless of the measure of ...
conservatism, we find consistent evidence that companies led by female CEOs report earnings
more conservatively.").
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female board representation leads to fewer accounting restatements. 4' The
authors suggest that this finding is consistent with the disruption of groupthink
and superior group decision-making dynamics. 4' Similarly, at least with respect
to Chinese firms, when there is more gender diversity on the board, there is less
securities fraud.42  Women are more likely to speak out against unethical
behavior and blow the whistle on misconduct than their male counterparts.43
Finally, empirical evidence shows that African-Americans, Latinos, Asian-
Americans, and whites have different ethical sensitivities.44
These differences in ethical sensibilities and risk sensitivities suggest that
business would be well-advised to diversify in order to assure that its behavior
conforms to the ethical expectations of all its key constituencies-labor pools,
supply chains, capital sources, consumers, and communities. 45  This point
benefits from empirical support that shows firms with more diverse boards
46achieve higher corporate social responsibility ratings. Diversity gives firms the
key to unlocking the prodigious value of an enhanced reputation and ethicality by
assuring that no important constituency finds the firm's conduct repellent and
that the firm's conduct fully acclimates itself to the full spectrum of ethical
40. See Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Female Board Presence and the Likelihood of Financial
Restatement, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 607, 626 (2012) ("Using a matched-pair sample of restatement
and control firms, we conducted conditional logistic regressions comparing the characteristics of
restatement and control firms. Briefly, we find a significant reduction in the likelihood of financial
restatement and the presence of at least one female board director."). As always, the authors
acknowledge issues related to possible omitted variables and the direction of causation. Id. at 626-
27.
41. See id. at 611-13, 627 ("We draw upon the groupthink and group dynamics perspectives to
suggest that female board presence creates an atmosphere in which viewpoints that may disrupt
group cohesion are communicated and considered, and the pace of decision-making is slowed.").
42. See Douglas Cumming et al., Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J.
1572, 1573 (2015) ("Our evidence shows that gender diversity reduces the likelihood of being in
our fraud sample and reduces the severity of the fraud.").
43. See Iris Vermeir & Patrick Van Kenhove, Gender Differences in Double Standards, 81 J.
Bus. ETHICS 281, 290 (2008) ("[W]omen are systematically less tolerant towards unethical actions
compared to men."); Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblower Disclosures and
Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107, 113 (1999) ("Internal whistle-blowers were far more likely to be
women than men.").
44. See, e.g., Costas Hadjicharalambous & Lynn Walsh, Ethnicity/Race and Gender Effects on
Ethical Sensitivity in Four Sub-Cultures, 15 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 119, 128 (2012)
(offering an empirical analysis of ethical variations across different racial/ethnic and gender
groups).
45. See Maretno Harjoto et al., Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility, 132 J.
Bus. ETHICS 641, 642 (2015) ("Firms could suffer both monetary and reputational losses from
failing to align management's interests with those of their stakeholders. Effective stakeholder
management is a critical requirement for firm success.").
46. Given that group dynamics and decision making vary depending on the background of the
individuals serving on corporate boards, a diverse group of directors brings a different knowledge
base, sets of experiences, and perspectives on society to group decision making. As a result,
diversity increases the board's ability to recognize the needs and interests of different groups of
stakeholders as reflected on CSR performance. Id.
[Vol. 48
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sensitivity within its operating environment. 47  Therefore, in-house counsel
should advise senior management to diversify the firm to the maximum extent
possible (including the adoption of policies aimed at inclusiveness of diverse
voices) for the purpose of insuring greater compliance and higher ethical
standards. 48 Naturally, this search for greater levels of cultural diversity should
include the corps of outside counsel representing the firm.
The true potential of ethnic and gender diversity to assure superior risk
management and compliance capabilities is just now beginning to emerge from
the world of social science. For example, no proponent of well-managed
diversity would advocate mere tokenism as a mechanism of unleashing the full
benefits of cultural diversity.49  Instead, diversity management requires that
diverse experiences represent a critical mass in any group setting to allow a
robust exchange of ideas and perspectives.5° Thus, studies regarding the impact
47. See Stephen Bear et al., The Impact of Board Diversity and Gender Composition on
Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Reputation, 97 J. Bus. ETHICS 207, 207 (2010).
Corporate reputation refers to "publics' cumulative judgment of firms over time. Research
has demonstrated a broad range of benefits associated with a positive reputation. A good
reputation enhances a firm's ability to attract job applicants. Reputation affects employee
retention as employees who feel their company is well regarded by external groups have
higher job satisfaction and a lower intention to leave their organizations. A positive reputation
also enhances corporate branding, enabling a company to use its brand equity to launch new
products and enter new markets. Reputation can positively affect financial performance,
institutional investment, and share price. A study by Mercer Investment Consulting indicated
that 46% of institutional investors consider environmental, social, and corporate governance
when making investment decisions, and McKinsey reports that institutional investors will pay
a premium (12-14%) for well-governed companies.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. Orlando C. Richard et al., The Impact of Racial and Gender Diversity in Management on
Financial Performance: How Participative Strategy Making Features Can Unleash a Diversity
Advantage, 13 INT'L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 2571, 2573 (2013) ("[S]cholars emphasize that for firms
to benefit from diversity, they must emphasize inclusiveness in the organization.").
49. As I highlighted in a seminal article on diversity in business in 2000:
Many corporations, most notably Texaco, have suffered dire consequences from an inability
to manage diversity. These instances, however, do not detract from the central thesis of this
article that businesses are using diversity as a competitive advantage in order to maximize
profits, and that the legal system should accommodate, encourage and respond positively to
this new paradigm of viewing diversity as a strength. Instead, these instances highlight the
need for policies that assure that business organizations truly embrace diversity rather than
pursue policies of tokenism or tacit exclusion. The point is that diversity must be properly
managed.
Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J. RACE. & L. 127, 140
(2000). Indeed, the concept that diversity must be embraced through policies and the pursuit of
best practices highlights the fundamental distinction between affirmative action (which focuses on
bringing traditionally excluded groups into organizations and institutions) and diversity policies
(which seek to further an organizations institutional mission through broadening cognitive
perspectives and experiences). Id. at 109-24.
50. As Rachel Moran states:
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of a critical mass of diverse voices are just now beginning to show how diversity
in the boardroom leads to greater innovation and firm performance-and such
studies focusing on critical mass are limited by the fact that few boards include a
critical mass of women, much less ethnic minorities.5' Many prior studies of the
impact of diversity in the world of business or finance necessarily fail to deal
with the confounding effects of tokenism.52 Ethnic and racial diversity is so rare
that virtually no empirical studies can assess the effect a critical mass of senior
managers has on financial performance and risk management.53
In terms of compliance and ethics, one key lesson to draw from the
emerging best practices of diversity management is that diverse voices must be
empowered to give voice to their diverse perspectives and experiences. 54 Critical
mass plays a critical role in assuring that such voices are heard and that tokenism
does not operate to isolate or silence workers or managers with different
Tokenism is the enemy of diversity. For groups previously excluded from access to legal
education, feelings of alienation and isolation not only retard academic achievement but also
silence the very voices that are the building blocks of a diverse law school. A critical mass of
these students is necessary to achieve a truly diverse student body that contributes to the
robust exchange of ideas.
Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 208 (2006) (quoting Rachel F. Moran et al., Statement of Faculty Policy
Governing Admission to Boalt Hall and Report of the Admissions Policy Task Force 24 (1993)).
See also Marleen A. O'Connor, Women Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures: The
Behavioral Dynamics of Gender, Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 468 (2006) (suggesting that
in the absence of a critical mass of diverse directors a single diverse member is likely to succumb to
pressures to conform).
51. See Jasmin Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What
Exactly Constitutes a "Critical Mass?," 118 J. Bus. ETHICS 61, 70 (2013) ("[W]e find evidence for
a U-shaped link between gender diversity on the board and firm performance ... [a board] needs a
critical mass of women ... to realize the advantages a more diverse board may offer. We find this
critical mass to be in the range of about 30% female representation. ); Mariateresa Torchia et
al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to Critical Mass, 102 J. Bus. ETHICS
299, 312 (2011) ("[Our] results show that the boards' contribution to ... innovation is higher in
boards with 'at least three women': boards where women directors reach critical mass.").
52. See Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance: A
Meta-Analysis, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1546, 1556 (2015) (reviewing 140 studies and finding that
gender diversity on boards enhances financial performance and accounting earnings in nations that
have strong investor protections and enjoy high gender parity but that "less than a handful" of
studies measure diversity through the lens of "critical mass").
53. See Lissa Lamkin Broome et al., Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from the Boardroom,
34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1049, 1078 (2011) ("[V]ery few of our texts address the issue of a critical
mass of minority (as opposed to female) directors. In part, this reflects the simple fact that it is hard
to find a public company with three or more minority directors.").
54. As the federal financial regulators put it:
Many entities promote the fair inclusion of minorities and women in their workforce by
publicizing employment opportunities, creating relationships with minority and women
professional organizations and educational institutions, creating a culture that values the
contribution of all employees, and encouraging a focus on these objectives when evaluating
the performance of managers.
Joint Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,016, 33,023 (June 10, 2015).
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perspectives and experiences. 55  Therefore a key element for the successful
management of diversity requires a manifest value for embracing diversity at the
highest level of a firm. Policies and procedures that are transparent, enforced
and openly available will determine if a firm benefits from diversity management
or suffers from diversity mismanagement. 57 Unfortunately, episodes of diversity
mismanagement still plague otherwise successful firms, even as of early 2017.58
In light of the above-referenced empirical evidence, in-house counsel can
and should proceed more aggressively with respect to the issue of enhanced
cultural diversity within their firms, and the corporate counsel they hire and
supervise. More diverse firms will curtail unnecessary reputational and
compliance risk through the heterogeneous perceptions of risk and ethics that a
diverse workforce and senior management manifestly bring to the table.
59
Further, heterogeneous work groups will naturally resist groupthink and affinity
bias,60 and induce superior group performance. 61 Diversity can enhance sound
risk management, which itself is a proven mechanism for superior financial
performance.62  This all adds up to superior performance, and superior
compliance and ethics outcomes.
63
55. See supra notes 20, 50, and 51 and accompanying text.
56. "The leadership of an organization with successful diversity policies and practices
demonstrates its commitment to diversity and inclusion." Joint Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,016,
33,023 (June 10, 2015).
57. "Entities are encouraged to disclose their diversity policies and practices, as well as
information related to their assessments, to ... the public." Id. at 33,024.
58. For example, the federal government reportedly commenced an investigation into
"settlements made with women who alleged sexual harassment by former Fox News boss Roger
Ailes, and questions about whether Fox had a duty to inform shareholders about the settlement
payments." Brian Stelter, Exclusive: Federal Probe of Fox News Expands, CNNMONEY (Apr. 27,
2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/27/media/fox-news-federal-investigation/. Fox paid
settlements of about $85 million attributable to sexual harassment claims. Emily Steel & Michael
S. Schmidt, Bill O'Reilly Payout Could Be as High as $25 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/business/media/bill-oreilly-payout.html?_r-0.
59. See Abbott et al., supra note 40, at 627 (suggesting that increased firm diversity will inhibit
or eliminate the risks of groupthink).
60. See Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PRoc. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. 18524, 18525 (2014) (explaining the correlation between ethnic homogeneity and lower
likelihood of price bubbles).
61. See STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR
AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW at xi-xviii (2012) ("The nation's largest financial institutions gorged
on levels of risk-particularly in the subprime (even predatory) mortgage business-unparalleled
in U.S. financial history.").
62. See Vincent Aebi et al., Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank Performance
in the Financial Crisis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 3213, 3224 (2012) (finding that banks with a more
independent risk management function outperformed other banks during the financial crisis).
63. Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/.
The fact is that if you want to build teams or organizations capable of innovating, you
need diversity. Diversity enhances creativity. It encourages the search for novel information
and perspectives, leading to better decision making and problem solving. Diversity can
improve the bottom line of companies and lead to unfettered discoveries and breakthrough
innovations. Even simply being exposed to diversity can change the way you think. This is
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II. THEORIZING OPTIMAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS
In the preceding section of this essay, I highlighted overwhelming empirical
evidence that different racial groups and genders hold different perspectives on
risk, ethics, and compliance. In this section, I highlight how, thus far, legal
reformers have not been able to construct legal and regulatory approaches that
sufficiently encourage counsel to speak out against inappropriate conduct that
ultimately harms their client to a very significant degree. Then I highlight how
cultural diversity, when properly managed, can empower corporate counsel to
voice dissent to costly misconduct.
It appears that counsel representing the public corporation in America
suffers from certain impediments in assuring a rational risk management function
insofar as ethics and compliance are concerned.64 The Enron series of corporate
scandals proved that widespread financial fraud could and would occur under the
legal and regulatory frameworks prevailing during that era. 65 Congress gave the
SEC power to promulgate, essentially, federal rules of professional responsibility
in response to this reality. More specifically, in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Congress authorized the SEC to impose new rules for governing the
obligation of counsel appearing before the Commission to report financial
wrongdoing.66
not just wishful thinking: it is the conclusion I draw from decades of research from
organizational scientists, psychologists, sociologists, economists and demographers.
Id.
64. For one, counsel is required by professional responsibility mandates to maintain client
confidences. Lisa Bank & Matthew LaGarde, Can General Counsel and Compliance Officers
Blow the Whistle?, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/attorneys-cos-blow-the-whistle/ ("Attorneys face the most difficult issues in deciding
whether to blow the whistle, as they are subject to the ethical rules of the jurisdiction in which they
practice. These ethical rules vary among the 50 states and the District of Columbia, but they are
generally uniform regarding the obligation to protect client information and communications.").
65. See Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of
Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 31-35 (2003).
66. Section 307 provides:
[T]he Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors,
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a
rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the
chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent
thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as
necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation),
requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of
directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely
of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2015).
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The SEC exercised its power to promulgate new rules applicable to counsel
appearing before the Commission on behalf of public firms. 67 The Commission's
new rules broke new ground by mandating that counsel report certain unlawful
behavior up the corporate ladder, and monitor senior management's response to
the report.68  The SEC's rules also authorized counsel to report certain
information out to the SEC.6 9 Before the SEC's initiative, lawyers for publicly
traded firms held the same obligation as all attorneys for reporting wrongdoing:
they could report putative wrongdoing only if they "know" of misconduct; and
they could report wrongdoing out of the corporation only if it posed a risk of
serious bodily harm or death."
The SEC also created a safe-harbor for counsel if a firm created a Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee ("QLCC") to receive counsel's reports of
wrongdoing. 1 The SEC required QLCCs to include at least one member of the
issuer's audit committee; to include two or more other outside directors; and, to
hold power to receive and investigate reports of potential misconduct. 72 If an
attorney reports evidence of potential wrongdoing to a QLCC, then the attorney
need not further monitor the response of senior management.73 Thus, the SEC
created incentives for firms to create QLCCs.
Nevertheless, very few publicly-traded firms created QLCCs. According to
the most recent data, only a small percentage of firms adopted a QLCC within
the first years after the SEC's promulgation of the rule creating QLCCs. 74 Thus,
the SOX innovations failed to prompt more whistleblowing from corporate
counsel-in-house or otherwise.75
67. Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2003).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d).
70. Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the New Realm of
Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CiN. L. REv. 609, 641-42 (2003).
When the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Rule 205 were enacted, ABA Model Rule 1.6 generally
prohibited an attorney from disclosing information relating to the attorney-client relationship.
The rule permitted disclosure only in limited circumstances where such revelations were
"reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm," were
required by law or court order, were necessary to comply with ethics rules, or were for
purposes of establishing a lawyer's fees or self-defense.
Id.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k).
72. Id.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).
74. "Over 96% of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange ... have not
established QLCCs." Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The
Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FOROHAM L. REv. 1251, 1252 (2005). "Resistance to the QLCC may be
understood as resistance to a monitoring board." Id. at 1282.
75. See RAMIpEz & RAMIREZ, supra note 13, at 99, 207 (reviewing all whistleblowers
emerging in the run up to the financial crisis and only identifying one lawyer, Alayne Fleischmann,
who blew the whistle long after the crisis). See also Burton, supra note 13.
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The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 only marginally changed this reality.7 6 While
not materially altering the duties imposed upon corporate counsel, the Dodd-
Frank Act did create incentives for corporate counsel to blow the whistle on
illegal conduct.77 Nevertheless, in terms of corporate counsel acting to stem
unlawful or unethical behavior, Dodd-Frank simply does not move the ball
forward in any meaningful way.
This essay cannot catalogue all of the reasons why counsel seemingly
resists putting a stop to questionable activities and transactions.7 8 Instead, the
article proceeds on the premise that the current legal and regulatory framework
governing corporate counsel does not operate to protect shareholders, the
investing public, and American capital markets. 79 Nothing demonstrates this
point better than the near universal silence of the corporate counsel on Wall
Street in the face of pervasive unlawful misconduct, not to mention widespread
business practices of dubious ethicality. 80 Despite these flaws, many corporate
counsels want to help their firms comply with law and engage in more ethical
behavior. 81 "There is decent evidence that individual lawyers-at least on some
level-hunger to be more ethical and want to assume a greater role in counseling
clients to observe the law."
82
Even beyond mere legal compliance, shareholders may also suffer losses
due to reputational risks arising from unethical conduct.83 With respect to both
compliance and ethics, the heterogeneous perspectives on risk, compliance, and
ethics arising from culturally diverse voices can at least help in-house counsel
define and manage ethical concerns. 84 Specifically, by elaborating the extent of
information the firm may access to assess conduct, the firm can operate beyond
law in a way that fully acclimates it to important populations, such as
consumers.85 If the ethical and compliance screening function firm mirrors the
cultural diversity of its labor, consumer, and capital pools, it will hold sufficient
insights to avoid alienating such suppliers and consumers through legal but
76. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111 th Cong., §§
111,152, 1011 (2010).
77. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys Act as
Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1054 (2015).
78. See generally Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists
Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REv. 129 (2011) (examining the arguments against the lawyer-gatekeeper
and outlining the resistance from the profession to such a role).
79. Id.
80. Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 11, at 362.
81. Hui Kim, supra note 78, at 159 ("[T]hree cognitive processes-self-interested motivation,
internalization of managers' views as a product of cognitive dissonance, and indifference to
abstract shareholders-explain why lawyers resist gatekeeping duties.").
82. Id.
83. Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 11, at 360-61.
84. Johnson et al., supra note 15, at 1816 ("Diversity gives ... firms the key to unlocking the
prodigious value of an enhanced reputation and ethicality by assuring that no important
constituency finds the firm's conduct repellent and that the firm's conduct fully acclimates itself to
the full spectrum of ethical sensitivity within its operating environment.").
85. See generally id.
[Vol. 48
COMPLIANCE IN-HOUSE
ethically dubious conduct.8 6 In short, under this approach, the diverse cultural
perspectives within the firm's pools of suppliers and consumers defines its
ethical compass and conscience, and the imperative of the firm to acclimate itself
optimally to these constituents, in order to maximize shareholder value, sets its
course of ethicality.
Basing the acclimation of the firm to cultural diversity should also operate
to provide the firm with a standard of ethicality more rigorous than the definition
of ethicality that has too often prevailed in the past.87 Under current law, most
firms subjected a proposed course of conduct to the ethics screen of only white
males, usually relying upon senior managers to supervise the work of underlings
with little or no external checks. 88  CEOs in particular played a key role in
determining appropriate conduct, and they are nearly all white males. 89  A
culturally diverse screening would necessarily add in the ethics sensitivities of
women and different ethnic groups. 90 These additional filters would create a new
set of standards that firms would abide by to cater to the sensibilities within its
key constituencies. 9 1 A diverse screening of conduct would lead to better
information about ethical, reputational, and compliance risk than a homogenous
screening, and could operate to protect shareholders from the adverse
consequences of such risks.
92
The next section of this essay articulates an approach based upon the firm's
manifest need to acclimate itself as positively as possible to the varying
86. Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 11, at 352.
87. Unfortunately, the guidance of ethicists to business leaders in terms of concrete decision-
making lacks clarity and fails to communicate standards of conduct to such leaders in a meaningful
way. See John Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8
Bus. ETHICS Q. 19, 19 (1998) ("[One] charge ... frequently lodged against the practical utility of
business ethics as a field of study concerns the apparent failure of communication between the
theorist and the business practitioner. Critics of the discipline often point out that business ethicists
are usually academics, and worse, philosophers, who speak in the language of abstract ethical
theory. Thus, they are accused of expressing their ideas in terms of 'deontological requirements,'
'consequentialist considerations,' 'the categorical imperative,' 'rule utilitarianism,' 'the hedonistic
calculus,' 'human flourishing' and other locutions that are essentially meaningless to the ordinary
business person who possesses little or no philosophical training.") (internal footnote omitted)).
88. See generally Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 11, at 365.
89. RICHARD ZWEIGENHAFT & G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE NEW CEOs: WOMEN, AFRICAN
AMERICAN, LATINO, AND ASIAN AMERICAN LEADERS OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES, at xii, xxiii
(paperback ed. 2014) (showing that women and minorities now lead only about 10% of the Fortune
500 as CEOs and hold only about 25% of directorships despite comprising nearly 64% of the
population).
90. See supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
92. Note that under a more hollow approach to shareholder wealth maximization would hold
that businesses would hold no ethical obligations. Fairly or not, this can be traced to Milton
Friedman who stated: "[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules
of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud."
See Hasnas, supra note 87, at 22. 1 argue that shareholder wealth maximization requires ethical and
compliance efforts beyond mere legal compliance to minimize losses and maximize gains from
firm reputation. Thus, the acclimation theory offered herein remains anchored in shareholder
wealth maximization even while suggesting conduct beyond mere compliance with law.
Spring 2017]
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
perspectives of its key constituencies, as a means for enabling in-house counsel
to guide their firms to superior ethical and compliance outcomes.
III. THE CORPORATE REALITY AND OVERCOMING CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY
This section seeks to show that in-house counsel can use cultural diversity
to get a more refined assessment of the appropriateness of a given course of
conduct or transaction. Cultural diversity may also mitigate affinity bias and
groupthink, thereby breaking down social barriers to speaking out against
unlawful and unethical conduct.
Cultural diversity gives the firm more elaborate insights into how key
constituencies will react to a given course of conduct or transaction. 93 Therefore,
in-house counsel should seek to arm the corporation with a structure that assures
proposed conduct and transactions that raise any potential ethical or compliance
issues are subjected to a culturally diverse group, with the charge that they report
on any ethical or compliance issues.94  I proposed a structure capable of
functioning in this way in 2010, building upon the SEC's QLCC innovation.
95
Given management's disinclination to establish such committees, in-house
counsel could suggest a compliance and ethics advisory council to work with in-
house counsel to subject questionable practices to more careful screening from
the group, including screening from culturally diverse perspectives. 96 If in-house
counsel determines that a given course of conduct or transaction warrants further
inquiry, in-house counsel could arrange for outside counsel to weigh-in.
97
By insisting that firms representing the corporation also hire and promote
culturally diverse attorneys, in-house counsel could assure that any opinion of
93. Information elaboration drives all elements of the benefits of diversity. Of course,
cognitive diversity and information elaboration is not limited to diverse cultural perspectives or
experiences associated with race or gender. See generally Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers and
Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413 (2014) (finding that lawyer-
directors add diversity to the board, give the board access to more elaborate information, and
thereby add value).
94. Some firms already seek greater diversity in their ranks. Kenneth Davis, Consulting Giant
Demands Diversity among Outside Counsel, GEN. COUNSEL CONSULTING,
http://www.gcconsulting.com/articles/l 20135/73/Consulting-Giant-Demands-Diversity-among-
Outside-Counsel/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) ("To bring more diversity into its law department,
Accenture has developed orientation and mentoring programs for its minority and women recruits.
The orientation program allows new hires to meet with management-level attorneys as well as
representatives from each practice area.").
95. Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 11, at 362-63.
96. See Rosen, supra note 74, at 1282.
97. Naturally, in-house counsel should refer thorny compliance and ethics issues to the law
firms sporting the greatest cultural diversity. Many in-house counsel already recognize this need.
See Rick Palmore, A Call to Action: Diversity in the Legal Profession (Oct. 2004),
http://www.acc.com/vl/public/Article/loader.cfrn?csModule=security/getfile&pageid= 6074&recor
ded=1 (citing Diversity in the Workplace: A Statement of Principle, 9 Bus. L. TODAY 41 (1999-
2000)) ("As Chief Legal Officers, we hereby reaffirm our commitment to diversity in the legal
profession. Our action is based on the need to enhance opportunity in the legal profession and our
recognition that the legal and business interests of our clients require legal presentation that reflects
the diversity of our employees, customers and the communities where we do business.").
[Vol. 48
COMPLIANCE IN-HOUSE
counsel itself benefit from the same multicultural screening, which is bound to be
more comprehensive in its assessment, and more rigorous in its screening.
98
Again, in-house counsel can take the lead in making sure its outside firms assure
the diverse voices within outside firms enjoy sufficient space and stature to voice
concerns. 99 In-house counsel holds a unique ability to influence major law firms
to embrace cultural diversity more aggressively. °1 In-house counsel can thus
diversify both the corporation they serve, as well as the law firms they hire and
supervise.
If counsel can persuade management to impose some substantial structure
for the purpose of screening conduct for reputational risk, and the firm has fully
diversified this function, in-house counsel has essentially secured the highest
level of scrutiny for the most dubious practices. 01 As such, the corporation is
now positioned to make decisions with the highest level of elaborated
information regarding how the course of conduct will be received within the
firm's key labor, capital, and consumer pools. 0 2  The firm can now weigh
potential unethical and unlawful behavior that presents risk to the firm's
reputation.
This information elaboration thereby remains anchored in the value of
shareholder wealth maximization.10 3 After all, what senior management team
would press ahead with a course of conduct that could impose severe reputational
costs in an important part of its key constituencies? 1 4  The fact that the
assessment of ethicality or compliance repercussions of a given business practice
would have been so comprehensively vetted within the firm, and by outside
counsel in appropriate cases, would presumably shield an in-house attorney from
much more patent risks and career threats in being forced to blow the whistle
alone, without the support of other culturally diverse voices. 1
05
Further, because cultural diversity disrupts groupthink and affinity bias, in a
way that triggers deeper thinking and more thorough preparation, this may well
98. Some high-profile firms also already do this. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 94 ("Accenture,
one of the world's largest consulting firms, is pushing its outside counsel to add more diversity to
their firms and is prepared to drop those who don't make efforts to improve.").
99. Id. ("Additionally, each firm had to describe how successful it was at retaining its minority
lawyers, whether it had any recruiting or retention programs for them, and how it measured the
effectiveness of such programs. Accenture shared the aggregate data with outside counsel, showing
them how they compared with their peers and encouraging firms to share ideas and best
practices.").
100. Id. ("In its meetings with the 15 firms during 2006, Accenture discussed how well each had
done in relation to the others. Each firm also developed an individual action plan in consultation
with the company.").
101. This follows logically from the differential approaches of women and people of color to
ethics and risks. A diversified screening process will assure conduct clears all relevant screens.
See supra Part II.
102. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
103. See supra Part II.
104. It may well prove to be a material fact that senior management ignored such an ethics
screening process, requiring public disclosure under the federal securities laws. THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 489 (6th ed. 2005).
105. See supra notes 5-6.
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cause superior outcomes across a range of considerations transcending ethics and
compliance risks. 10 6  The firm would thus benefit financially, not just from
diminished reputational costs, legal costs, and regulatory concerns, but even
more directly through superior decision making.' 7  This accords itself with
abundant evidence linking the embrace of cultural diversity to superior financial
performance and cognition gains. 1° 8
Essentially, in-house counsel can use enhanced cultural diversity to create a
more refined filter for pursuing shareholder primacy.'0 9 This shifts responsibility
from a single in-house attorney to an institutional organ within the firm." 0 In
appropriate cases, regulators may even insist on such an organ. 1 Counsel can
arm the firm with appropriate policies and procedures to assure the full benefits
of cultural diversity accrue to the corporation and that the firm approach optimal
diversification. 112  In sum, well-managed cultural diversity gives in-house
counsel a key tool to enhance reputational risk management.
The more that in-house counsel can encourage cultural diversity within the
firm, and within its primary providers of legal advice, the less likely it is to
engage in conduct that any important constituencies are likely to find repellent.
The goal should be to diversify the firm to the same extent as its labor pool,
consumers, and capital providers. At the same time, given the empirical record
of enhanced cultural diversity within well-managed firms, it appears unlikely that
106. See supra notes 7, 20 & 23.
107. More recent examples of these costs include the fiascos at Volkswagen and Wells Fargo.
Geoff Colvin, The Wells Fargo Scandal Is Now Reaching VW Proportions, FORTUNE (Jan. 26,
2017, 2:52 PM), http://fortune.com/2017/01/25/the-wells-fargo-scandal-is-now-reaching-vw-
proportions/ ("I thought it would be a long time before a corporate scandal got bigger and worse
than the Volkswagen emissions-cheating mess. I still think that, but almost every day the Wells
Fargo situation makes me wonder if it might soon surpass even VW in overall awfulness.").
108. Phillips, supra note 64.
109. While many scholars eschew the very concept of shareholder primacy within the public
corporation, I maintain that the problems associated with the public firm usually do not arise from
shareholder primacy, but from the perversion of the concept into CEO primacy. See Steven A.
Ramirez, Lessons From the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1, 52 (2009) ("Excessive CEO autonomy played a central role in the subprime mortgage crisis....
Specifically, corporate governance law in the United States permits CEOs of public firms to
generate current income to enhance their own compensation without regard to risk. The cost of this
excessive autonomy reaches into the tens of trillions of dollars.").
110. The concept that CEOs are not always the repository for ultimate control of every
corporate function and that corporate law scholars need to think harder about mechanisms for
optimizing the institutional role of the CEO within the modem public corporation is not new. See
Steven A. Ramirez & Betty Simkins, Enterprise Wide Risk Management and Corporate
Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHi. L. J. 571, 588 (2008) ("A CEO-centric model of risk management
[will] not lead to suboptimal results.... Risk management can be enhanced through diversity in
perspectives and expertise. Therefore, the CEO is not the optimal center for all risk management,
even if CEO input is essential for any kind of meaningful risk management."). This proposed
institutional design would assist in-house counsel in managing ethics and compliance risk, natural
arena to displace CEO autonomy.
111. See Johnson et al., supra note 15, at 1851-67 (reviewing the power of financial regulators
to impose new institutional limits on senior management of errant financial firms).
112. See supra notes 19, 21, 54, 56& 57.
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more cultural diversity within any firm will materially harm financial
performance.
CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence demonstrates that America's diverse population
holds differing approaches to ethics, compliance, and risk. In-house counsel can
harness these differences to assure that a firm's conduct comports with, and
acclimates to, the differing ethical and compliance sensibilities and sensitivities
within the general population, and within key corporate constituencies such as
labor, investor and consumer pools. Essentially, in-house counsel can assure that
any proposed business conduct or transaction clears all relevant filters-not just
the traditional white male filter-and advise senior management accordingly.
Counsel wishing in good faith to stem misconduct would hold an additional tool:
feedback from within the firm, or from outside counsel, that diverse perspectives
found the proposed course of business or transaction objectionable. Only
management uninterested in acclimating the firm to the cultural diversity within
key corporate constituencies would proceed in the face of such feedback.
While cultural diversity alone will not compensate for the flawed legal
frameworks at play in this arena, it may arm in-house counsel with tools that can
deliver superior outcomes more often than traditionally has been the case. At the
very least, enhanced cultural diversity embedded in a screening function within
the firm, that is armed with the tools for a heterogeneous assessment of the most
dubious firm practices, provides the firm with an objective and rigorous basis for
determining the ethicality and costs of a given practice or course of conduct. The
firm will at least find itself well-equipped to acclimate itself to its key
constituencies and that should stem the costliest corporate misconduct. Given the
macroeconomic catastrophe that followed the collapse of the financial sector in
2008 and 2009, improvement may prove easy.
Spring 2017]

